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Abstract
This paper studies the impact of unconventional monetary policy on the economy and its
interactions with bank supervisory rules. In particular, we look at the impact of liquidity
injections (quantitative easing) and repurchases of impaired loans (qualitative easing) under
increased capital requirements for banks. We show that quantitative easing is most effective
in terms of reducing losses in GDP and consumption which occur after a financial shock but
leads to high fluctuations in inflation and GDP. Qualitative easing, on the contrary, has only
a small impact on GDP and consumption but does not increase the volatility of inflation and
GDP as much as quantitative easing. When unconventional monetary policy is combined with
stricter bank regulation, we find that qualitative easing becomes more effective in terms of
reducing losses in GDP and consumption, whereas quantitative easing becomes less effective.
Moreover, we show that stricter bank regulation helps to decrease the volatility of inflation
and GDP caused by quantitative measures.
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1 Introduction
The eruption of the financial crisis in 2007 and its extraordinary impact on markets, called for
extraordinary measures. After lowering interest rates to the zero lower bound, central banks all
over the world were urged to support the economy - and the financial sector in particular - with
various unconventional measures. Amongst them were liquidity injections (quantitative easing),
the repurchase of impaired loans (qualitative easing)1, and direct lending to firms.
For the implementation of unconventional measures which aim to stabilize financial markets, it
is crucial to understand how they transmit through the economy and how they interact with bank
regulations. Unfortunately, theoretical models of monetary policy which would be suitable for such
an analysis were rare at that time. There were certainly several papers on conventional monetary
policy. For instance, Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005) and Smets and Wouters (2007).
These models, however, assume frictionless financial markets, thus missing possible spillovers from
financial intermediaries on the real economy which were the reasons behind the unconventional
interventions by central banks in first place.
On the other side, models which incorporate financial frictions, starting with Bernanke, Gertler,
and Gilchrist (BGG, 1999), and later followed by Iacoviello (2005), fail to properly account for the
cause of the financial crisis because they concentrate on the agency problem between banks and
firms and also emphasize the role of firms’ collateral value and not the possible default of banks.
Recently, several papers established models with financial intermediaries and endogenous default
probabilities to fill this gap in the literature. Gertler and Karadi (2009), Gertler and Kiyotaki
(2010), for instance, add financial intermediaries to the model of Christiano, Eichenbaum, and
Evans (2005) and to Smets and Wouters (2007) with a financial accelerator according to BGG, to
quantitatively assess the effect of unconventional measures. Dib (2010) implements an interbank
market and imposes regulatory requirements on banks into the model of BGG and investigates
how liquidity injections and asset swaps affect the economy. Gerali et al. (2010) add a banking
sector into a DSGE model with credit frictions and borrowing constrains according to Iacoviello
(2005), to study the role of credit supply factors in business cycle fluctuations. Angeloni and
Faia (2010) introduce banks, modeled as in Diamond and Rajan (2000, 2001) in a standard DSGE
macro model and use this framework to understand monetary policy transmission and the interplay
between monetary policy and bank capital regulation when banks are exposed to runs. de Walque
et al. (2009) develop a DSGE model along the lines of Goodhart et al. (2005) and Goodhart et al.
(2006) with a heterogeneous banking sector and endogenous default probabilities acting as financial
accelerators to examine the relationship between the banking sector and the real economy as well
the contribution of monetary policy and supervisory measures on restoring financial stability.
Our paper is related to the studies stated above but particularly draws on de Walque et al.
(2009). To capture crucial trade-offs and transmission mechanisms which were at work during
the financial crisis, we are introducing nominal rigidities a´ la Rotemberg into the model of de
Walque et al. (2009). This is one contribution of our paper and enables us to take into account
the behavior of inflation after unconventional measures are introduced. Moreover, we take into
1Quantitative easing is associated with creation of new money and expansion of banks’ balance sheet whereas
asset swaps of loans in exchange for government bonds alter the composition of banks’ assets in the balance sheet
but leave the balance sheet totals unchanged.
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account the possibility of adjusting the supervisory environment of banks. To that end, we fol-
low for calls for a new supervisory standards that have been demanded and discussed by public,
researchers, and regulators in the aftermath of the crisis2 by addressing two possible changes in
the bank regulation. Firstly, we complement the standard capital requirement for banks with an
additional one by introducing a leverage ratio besides the standard minimum capital ratio like in
Basel III. Secondly, we consider a further modification to the minimum capital ratio for banks by
relating it to indicators on macroeconomic activity in particular to the output gap. This allows us
to mitigate procyclicality of the capital adequacy rules. Thirdly, we introduce an insurance scheme
for banks as proposed, for instance, by Kashyap, Rajan, and Stein (2008), in which insurance
payments provide banks with additional funds. This insurance kicks in after an occurrence of a
systemic “event”. We define this “event” as a substantial increase in the credit default rates of
firms and banks.
Our framework is a DSGE model with a heterogeneous banking sector and nominal rigidities.
Non-financial firms set prices a´ la Rotemberg, choose labor, capital, and loans. Households chose
consumption, leisure time, and the amount of deposit they want to hold. They do not borrow. The
banking sector consists of two types of banks: “deposit banks” and “lending banks” which face
endogenous balance sheet decisions and are constrained by capital regulation rules. Deposit banks
collect deposits from households and give loans to lending banks. Lending banks provide loans to
non-financial firms and lend on the interbank market. Deposit banks are net creditors whereas
lending banks are net debtors in the interbank market. Both lending banks and firms can default
on their loans, but are subject to quadratic adjustment costs. These defaults have the effect of
financial accelerators. Unconventional monetary policy is introduced according to Dib (2010) by
assuming that banks can receive liquidity injections from the central bank or exchange a portion
of their loans for a risk-free asset. Moreover, we allow for liquidity injections to non-financial firms
as well, which is another contribution of our model.
Overall, the economy is subject to productivity shocks, monetary policy shock, unconventional
monetary policy shocks, and financial stability shocks. Except for unconventional monetary policy
shocks and financial stability shocks all other perturbations a rather standard in the literature and
do not require further details. Unconventional monetary measures are exogenous and enter into
the model through shocks to the budget constraint of banks and firms. Financial stability shocks,
however, are modeled by a substantial increase in the default rate of banks and firms. In order to
do so, we simulate a second model where default rates are exogenous. This enables us to change
the rate of default by any amount we would like to simulate. We do this for two reasons. First,
we want to replicate the environment of the financial crisis where we saw increased default rates
for both banks and firms. Second, this allows us to evaluate the impact of the insurance scheme
for banks which is triggered after a high increase in credit default rates.
Our results show that direct lending to firms and liquidity injections are most effective in
terms of reducing losses in GDP and consumption which occur after a financial shock. However,
2See among many others “Annual Jackson Hole Economic Policy Symposium” in the year 2008 “Maintaining
Stability in a Changing Financial System” or Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2009a) and Basel Committee
on Banking Supervision (2009b), for instance.
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when we take volatilities into account, direct lending to firms leads to the highest fluctuation
in inflation and second highest volatility in GDP. Liquidity injections also strongly increase the
volatility of GDP and inflation. Asset swaps, on the contrary, have almost no impact, neither on
GDP and consumption losses, nor on the volatility of inflation, GDP, and consumption. Stricter
bank regulatory requirements reduce losses in GDP with almost no impact on volatilities. When
unconventional monetary policy is combined with stricter bank regulation, we find that qualitative
easing becomes more effective in terms of reducing losses in GDP and consumption, whereas
quantitative easing becomes less effective. Interestingly, direct lending to firms becomes even
more effective in mitigating losses in GDP and consumption when combined with a leverage ratio
requirement like in Basel III.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The setup of the basic model is introduced in
Section 1.2. In Section 1.3, we discuss the calibration of the model. Section 1.4, we conduct the
impulse response analysis and discuss results. Section 1.5 concludes.
2 The Baseline Model
Our framework is a DSGE model with nominal rigidities. The economy is inhabited by households,
banks, non-financial firms, and a central bank. Banking sector consists of deposit and lending banks
which interact in an interbank market. Central bank conducts both conventional and unconven-
tional monetary policy; as our model lacks any distinct fiscal or supervisory authorities, we assume
that the central bank takes over those roles. In particular, it supervises banking sector through
capital and leverage ratios.
Overall, the economy is subject to various perturbations: productivity, monetary policy, quan-
titative, and qualitative monetary easing shocks to banks and firms as well as financial stability
shocks.
2.1 Households
Households allocate their resources to consumption Ct and investments and choose their leisure
time (1−Nt). They provide labor Nt against wage wt, place deposits D
h
t against an interest rate
rlt with deposit banks and do not borrow. Following de Walque et al. (2009) we impose a target
in deposits Dh via a quadratic disutility term3. This means that households dislike deviations of
their deposits from the long-run optimal level. The households maximization program is given by:
max
Ct,Nt,D
h
t
∞∑
s=0
βsEt

log (Ct+s) +m log (1−Nt+s)− χ2
(
Dht
1 + rlt+s
−
Dh
1 + r
l
)2
 (1)
under the budget constraint:
Ct +
Dht
1 + rlt
= wtNt +
Dht−1
pit
+Πft + (1− vb)Π
b
t + (1− vl)Π
l
t (2)
where pit = Pt/Pt−1 is inflation and Π
f
t , Π
b
t , Π
l
t are profits of firms, lending banks, and deposit
3This term is necessary for technical reasons. For χ = 0, first order conditions in (29) and (36) give the steady
state for rlt leaving D
h
t undetermined. χ is kept very low so that the dynamics of the model are not altered
significantly by its use.
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banks, respectively. Households fully own firms and they receive a share of banks profits in line
with retained earnings ratios vb and vl.
First order conditions of the households optimization problem are presented in the Appendix.
2.2 Non-financial Firms
Entrepreneurs choose price P (i)t, labor N (i)t, capital K (i)t, loans L (i)
f
t to rebuild capital stock
and repayment rate on past borrowings α (i)t from the profit maximization. They face price
adjustment costs a´ la Rotemberg which introduce a nominal rigidity into the model.
max
P (i)
t
,K(i)
t
,N(i)
t
,L(i)ft ,α(i)t
∞∑
s=0
Etβt+sΠ(i)
f
t+s (3)
where the profit is given by:
Π (i)
f
t =
P (i)t
Pt
Y (i)t − wtN (i)t −
α (i)t L (i)
f
t−1
pit
−
M (i)
f
t−1
pit
−
γ
2
[(
1− α (i)t−1
)(L (i)ft−2
pit−1
+ df
)]2
−
ψ
2
(
P (i)t
P (i)t−1
− pi∗
)2
Yt (4)
pi∗ is the economy-wide inflation rate and the parameter ψ measures the degree of price sticki-
ness. The higher ψ, the more sluggish is the adjustment of nominal prices; ψ = 0 implies flexible
prices. In addition, non-financial firms bear quadratic costs of default on their loans4. At times of
financial distress, when bank lending is scarce or difficult to obtain, central bank may step in and
provide firms with additional liquidity M (i)ft in order to help them to build up capital needed for
production.
The production sector comprises of a continuum of monopolistically competitive firms each
facing a downward-sloping demand curve for its differentiated product
Y (i)t =
(
P (i)t
Pt
)
−θ
Yt (5)
where P (i)t is the profit-maximizing price consistent with production level Y (i)t. Parameter θ
is the elasticity of substitution between two differentiated goods. Both the aggregate price level Pt
and aggregate output Yt are beyond control of the individual firm. The aggregates for the economy
are written as
Yt = K
η
t (exp (At)Nt)
1−η (6)
4The expenses related to default consist of a variable part that relates to the notional of outstanding loans in
the economy,
(
1− α (i)t−1
)
L(i)
f
t−2
pit−1
, and an additional fixed cost,
(
1− α (i)t−1
)
df . Linearity of cost would imply
indeterminacy for (32); partition of cost is done in analogy to the setup of the maximization problem for lending
banks, where this partitioning allows to reconcile (36), (39) and (41) when determining steady state values for rbt ,
rlt and it.
de Walque et al. (2009) solve this technicality by splitting the expenses related to default into non-pecuniary
costs that affect utility and pecuniary costs that impact profits. However, as they acknowledge, this ’double cost’
lacks pure micro foundations. In our opinion, segmentation of the pecuniary default costs into a fixed and variable
portion is more appealing micro-economically.
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Kt = (1− τ)Kt−1 +
Lft
1 + rbt
+
Mft
1 + rt
(7)
At = ρaAt−1 + ε
A
t (8)
where firms produce output according to a Cobb-Douglas function with At functioning as
an aggregate productivity shock. Equation (7) describes the law of motion for capital which
depreciates at rate τ . Firms can obtain loans from lending banks Lft at interest rate r
b
t or receive
liquidity from the central bank Mft at times of financial distress. Since firms are fully owned by
households, their discount factor is given by:
βt+s = β
s Ct
Ct+s
(9)
First order conditions are solved assuming a symmetric equilibrium and are presented in the
Appendix.
2.3 Banks
When modeling the banking sector we lean on de Walque et al. (2009) and Dib (2010) and introduce
deposit banks and lending banks. Both types of banks are risk-averse.
Deposit Banks
Deposit banks collect deposits from households Dlt and provide lending banks with loans D
bs
t on
the interbank market. They also allocate their resources to a market book B
l
, which is assumed to
be exogenous and to yield a return ρ. In addition, deposit banks derive utility from holding own
funds F lt above the capital requirement k and the leverage limit h - both imposed by the central
bank - but they face opportunity costs rtF
l
t of maintaining these funds. We define leverage ratio
as an inverse of the leverage multiple which is a ratio of total assets to equity. Contrary to the
capital ratio, leverage ratio does not involve any riskiness weights of the assets and it serves as a
primal measure of the sheer size of the balance sheet. In our basic setup we first assume that the
central bank does not care about leverage ratio (bF l = 0); then, in Section 4, we present simulation
results for the case when leverage ratio does become an instrument of financial regulation.
The maximization program of the deposit banks is:
max
Dlt,D
bs
t
∞∑
s=0
Etβt+s


log
(
Πlt+s
)
+ dF l
[
F lt+s − k
(
wl
(
Dbst+s − x
l
t+s
)
+ wB
l
)]
+bF l
[
F lt+s − h
(
Dbst+s +B
l
)]

 (10)
under the constraints:
Πlt =
δtD
bs
t−1
pit
−
Dbst
1 + rit
+
Dlt
1 + rlt
−
Dlt−1
pit
+ ζl (1− δt−1)
Dbst−2
pit−1
+
ρB
l
pit
+xlt −
xlt
1 + rt
+
M lt
1 + rt
−
M lt−1
pit
− rtF
l
t (11)
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F lt = (1− ξl +$l)
F lt−1
pit
+ vlΠ
l
t (12)
Loans on the interbank market are prone to lending banks’ default rate (1− δt). Deposit banks’
own funds increase by a share of profits that are not redistributed to households vlΠ
l
t; a small pro-
portion of funds ξl is put into an insurance scheme run by the central bank. A fraction ζl of the
lending banks’ defaulted amount is paid back from this insurance, decreasing the losses suffered
from impaired loans on the interbank market. Another portion of the insurance payout, provided
by the central bank, is aimed to increase equity of the deposit banks by $l. This insurance payout
kicks in only if the solvency of the lending banks deteriorates notably.
Furthermore, deposit banks can exchange a portion of their lending for a risk-free asset xlt as
a measure of so called qualitative easing policy conducted by the central bank. The quantitative
policy actions, i.e. liquidity injections, operate through M lt . We assume that the portion of assets
xlt under the swap agreement is impaired and would not pay any return otherwise.
First order conditions are presented in Appendix.
Lending Banks
Equivalently to deposit banks, lending banks derive additional utility from holding extra funds F bt
(above the levels implied by the capital and leverage ratios) at the opportunity cost of rtF
b
t . The
maximization program of lending banks is given by:
max
Dbdt ,L
b
t ,δt
∞∑
s=0
Etβt+s


log
(
Πbt+s
)
+ dF b
[
F bt+s − k
(
wb
(
Lbt+s − x
b
t+s
)
+ wB
b
)]
+bF b
[
F bt+s − h
(
Lbt+s +B
b
)]

 (13)
under the constraints:
Πbt =
αtL
b
t−1
pit
−
Lbt
1 + rbt
+
Dbdt
1 + it
−
δtD
bd
t−1
pit
−
ω
2
[
(1− δt−1)
(
Dbdt−2
pit−1
+ dδ
)]2
+ζb (1− αt−1)
Lbt−2
pit−1
+
ρB
b
pit
+ xbt −
xbt
1 + rt
+
M bt
1 + rt
−
M bt−1
pit
− rtF
b
t (14)
F bt = (1− ξb +$b)
F bt−1
pit
+ vbΠ
b
t (15)
Lending banks provide loans to the firms Lbt , borrow from deposit banks D
bd
t , invest in an
exogenous market book B
b
at yield of ρ, and choose their optimal repayment rate δt. In addition,
lending banks can receive liquidity injections from the central bank M bt (quantitative easing) or
swap a fraction of their loans against a risk-free asset xbt (qualitative easing). We assume that
xbt is impaired in that it pays no return when retained in the loan portfolio. Lending banks face
pecuniary costs of default represented by a quadratic cost function ω2
[
(1− δt−1)
(
Dbdt−2
pit−1
+ dδ
)]2
.
Quadratic formulation prevents indeterminacy in the first order condition (41); dδ stands for a
fixed costs of default which are independent from the total amount of the defaulted interbank
loans (1− δt−1)
Dbdt−2
pit−1
.
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Similar to deposit banks, lending banks increase own funds by a share of profits that are not
redistributed to households vbΠ
b
t ; a small proportion of funds ξb is put into an insurance scheme,
which is motivated by the fact that lending banks face losses on their loans to firms in accordance
with firms’ defaults ratio (1− αt). A fraction ζb of the firms’ defaulted amount is reimbursed by
the insurance. In the case of a substantial increase in firms default rate, lending banks may be
supported by equity capital $b provided by the central bank.
First order conditions are presented in the Appendix.
2.4 Central Bank
The monetary authority conducts its policy according to a Taylor-type policy rule:
(1 + rt) = (1 + r)
(1−µr) (1 + rt−1)
µr
( pit
pi∗
)Qp ( Yt
Yt−1
)Qy
exp (εrt ) (16)
At times of financial distress it can use unconventional instruments: liquidity injections M
(·)
t
(quantitative easing) or qualitative monetary easing x
(·)
t aimed at supporting both types of banks
and firms. We model all unconventional monetary tools as AR (1) processes:
xlt = ρxx
l
t−1 + ε
xl
t (17)
xbt = ρxx
b
t−1 + ε
xb
t (18)
M lt = ρMM
l
t−1 + ε
Ml
t (19)
M bt = ρMM
b
t−1 + ε
Mb
t (20)
Mft = ρMM
f
t−1 + ε
Mf
t (21)
It is assumed that the deposit, interbank, and commercial loan markets clear in the long run.
However, in the short run the central bank may inject liquidity such that:
M lt = D
l
t −D
h
t (22)
M bt = D
bs
t −D
bd
t (23)
Mft = L
f
t − L
b
t (24)
By assumption, the central bank finances liquidity injections, capital injections to banks, asset
swaps, and payoffs from the insurance scheme by collecting contributions from banks.
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3 Calibration
In the calibration we push our model towards a steady state with very low interest rates (around
0.5%) and yields on the market book (1%) in order to simulate an environment of low asset returns.
Real sector
We normalize employment to 0.2 and use Cobb-Douglas production function with labor share
= 2/3. We utilize the assumption that capital stock is 10 times higher than production and set
depreciation rate at 3%. This implies an investment ratio to output of 0.3 and allows us to avoid
a negative search cost γ on the defaulted amount. ρa, the autoregression coefficient for the tech-
nology equation (8), is equal 0.95 which is a standard in the RBC literature.
We set the value for the default rate of firms equal to 5% (an therefore αt = 0.95 in steady
state) which is inferred from the US courts and the Bureau of Labor Statistics quarterly pre-crisis
data on business bankruptcies. The data are based on the number of non-financial corporations
that go bankrupt. This enables us to deduct values for γ (firms default cost parameter) and m
(households leisure utility parameter). Both firms fixed default cost parameter and the smoothing
parameter for deposits are set close to 0 (χ = 0.01, df = 0.001), in order to eschew any dynamic
effects (positive χ enforces finding a steady state value for Dht ). We also introduce a penalty pa-
rameter for setting prices above the economy-wide level of 50, which we obtain by comparing the
elasticity of inflation to the real marginal cost in our model with the slope coefficient of the log-
linear Phillips curve using a Calvo approach. Expressed as (1−δ)(1−βδ)
δ
, where δ is the probability
of not resetting the price, this slope coefficient is found in the literature to be around 0.75 (see
discussion of the frequency of price adjustment in Faia and Monacelli (2007), for instance).
Banking sector
In order to simulate the environment of low interest rates we set the deposit rate at r
l
= 0.35%
and assume that the market book offers a mere ρ = 1%, which lies below the average quarterly
return of the Dow Jones Industrial Average Index from 1980Q1 to 2010Q3 (1.96%). However, this
assumption may actually be somehow questionable due to possible assets bubbles when interest
rates, i.e. borrowing costs are extremely low.
We set lending banks default rate δ = 0.98 which is derived from the pre-crisis data provided by the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. These data encompasses the number of bank failures. Fur-
thermore, when calibrating the model we impose Dl/Lb to be around 2, Dbd/Lb = Dbs/Lbaround
0.5, which is in line with pre-crisis statistics of the Federal Reserve System. The market book for
each bank equals firm loans: B
b
= B
l
= Lb.
The weights of bank assets are aligned to the Basel agreement: wb = 0.8 and wl = 0.05. Capital
ratio is set at k = 8% and leverage ratio at h = 4%. Banks are supposed to allocate half of their
profits to own funds (vb = vl = 0.5) and the remaining 50% are distributed to the households.
The insurance scheme is assumed to enable banks to recover 80% of bad loans; in exchange, banks
must pay premia of around 6 − 7% of their funds (ξb = 0.06 and ξl = 0.07, due to differences in
default rates for firms and lending banks) in order to benefit from this provision. The parameter
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of fixed default costs for lending banks dδ is equal to 0.001.
Other parameters - default cost parameter ω and own funds utility parameters for both bank
types, dF b , dF l , bF b and bF l - are inferred from the restrictions mentioned above.
Central bank
Taylor-type monetary policy rule contains parameters that are set according to specifications used
in the literature and satisfy the Taylor rule principle (µr = 0.7, Qp = 1.2, Qy = 0.05). Regression
parameters for all unconventional monetary tools (ρ(·)) are set to 0.85.
4 Quantitative Results
4.1 Impulse Responses
In this section we examine dynamic properties of our model by means of impulse response analy-
sis. We investigate how shocks propagate through the system and affect the key macroeconomic
variables. Our analysis starts with a short review of impulse responses to innovations in technol-
ogy and monetary policy and then it passes on to inspection of shocks induced by unconventional
monetary policy actions.
Standard analysis: Technology and monetary policy shocks
Figure 5 in the Appendix shows that a positive technology shock has positive effects on consump-
tion, capital, output, and GDP. In the short run all interest rates and inflation increase, but after
about 10 periods they all fall below their initial steady state levels. Interbank, deposit, and firms’
lending rates react in a less pronounced way than the policy rate due to the adjustment costs of
changing those rates.
Following the positive technology shock, demand for capital increases and is matched by a ris-
ing supply of loans to the firms. On the impact of the shock, profits of banks grow; however, firms’
profits initially decline before returning to their pre-shock steady state level. This is due to rising
capital costs caused by more expensive loans which also drives up the marginal cost. On the one
hand, increases in the borrowing rate for capital reduces firms’ profits. On the other hand, firms
are subject to constraints set by price adjustment cost when trying to pass on the loan burden to
consumers. Finally, positive technology shock leads to falling default rates for firms and lending
banks; interest rates and inflation decrease in the long-run as a result of higher productivity and
output.
When compared to Dib (2010) we observe responses to the technology shock in our model to
be generally in line with his results. Notable exceptions are inflation and the policy rate where
slightly different patterns of reaction can be observed. Dib (2010) finds that both fall immediately
after the shock occurs and return gradually to their initial steady state levels thereafter. Yet, it
seems to be reasonable that after a positive technology shock interest rates should increase. Two
arguments speak in favor for this notion. First, central bank would increase its policy rate to close
the output gap; second, higher demand for firm loans leads to an increase in interbank borrowing
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and thus to a rising demand for deposits. Consequently, the interest rates for these aggregates
should increase.
As shown in Figure 6 in the Appendix, an expansionary monetary policy shock produces per-
sistent moves in inflation and interest rates (except for the policy rate itself whose shock we model
as an AR(1) process). After the monetary policy shock, consumption and capital increase; output
stays almost unchanged; GDP grows, however, the effect on it seems to fade away relatively quickly.
After the expansionary monetary policy shock banks’ profits expand; in case of lending banks, this
is due to rising demand for commercial loans and improving solvency within firms. In the case
of deposit banks, this is causes by the fact that the interest rate for their liabilities is decreasing
stronger than the interest rate for their assets. Reaction of inflation is somehow puzzling as we
would expect it to rise after a decrease in the policy rate. This is presumably attributable to the
model setup in which production sector simultaneously marks up its production. Falling interest
rates throughout the economy contribute to the reduction in marginal cost for firms, i.e. reduction
in capital costs weights out rising labor cost. However, firms’ profits tend to decrease temporarily
on the impact of the monetary policy shock as initially the build-up in capital is not matched by
an increase in output.
Dib’s (2010) analysis points to decreasing industrial loans and a short-run increase in the firms’
borrowing rate after the expansionary monetary policy rate shock hits the economy. In our model,
however, this shock leads to a fall in the borrowing rate along with an increased demand for firms’
loans. We interpret our result as more intuitive since it reconfirms the expectation of falling interest
rates throughout the whole economy after a cut in the policy rate.
Unconventional monetary policy
Figure 1 displays impulse responses after a liquidity injection to lending banks. This shock tends
to have only temporary effects on economic aggregates. It decreases the risk-free rate, inflation,
firms’ borrowing rate, deposit rate, and the interbank interest rate. Figure 1 shows that following
a liquidity shock, output, and GDP rise, yet their reaction - like for most of the variables - is not
persistent. This effect is due to the persistence of liquidity itself as it is an AR(1) process with lag
parameter ρMb . Since we assume that in the steady state the interbank market clears, liquidity
injections are equal to zero in the long run. Imbalances in the interbank market after the liquidity
shock are then quickly forced to equilibrium by the movement in the interbank interest rate and an
adjustment in default rate of lending banks. Liquidity injection to lending banks seems to crowd
out interbank loans and improve lending bank profits as they choose to default on a portion of
their interbank borrowing given cheaper refinancing from the central bank. Deposit bank profits
improve as well due to falling deposit rates.
Our results generally reconfirm the findings of Dib (2010). Output, consumption, inflation,
policy rate, and other aggregates show the same pattern of behavior after the shock, however, they
differ in persistence.
Liquidity injections to deposit banks serve as an instrument of supporting interbank market by
strengthening the liquidity position of deposit banks (for instance, in case of significant deposit
withdrawals). As shown in Figure 7 in the Appendix such liquidity injections to deposit banks
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Figure 1: Figure 1.1: Impulse responses after a liquidity injection shock to lending banks
5 10 15 20 25 30
−0.1
−0.05
0
interbank rate
5 10 15 20 25 30
−0.1
−0.05
0
firms borrowing rate
5 10 15 20 25 30
−0.1
−0.05
0
deposit rate
5 10 15 20 25 30
−0.2
−0.1
0
risk−free rate
5 10 15 20 25 30
−0.1
−0.05
0
inflation
5 10 15 20 25 30
−10
0
10
loans to firms supply
5 10 15 20 25 30
−10
0
10
loans to firms demand
5 10 15 20 25 30
−20
0
20
loans to lending banks supply
5 10 15 20 25 30
−20
0
20
loans to lending banks demand
5 10 15 20 25 30
−5
0
5
deposit supply
5 10 15 20 25 30
−5
0
5
deposit demand
5 10 15 20 25 30
0
0.5
1
lending banks capital
5 10 15 20 25 30
0
0.5
deposit banks capital
5 10 15 20 25 30
−0.05
0
0.05
consumption
5 10 15 20 25 30
0
0.2
0.4
capital
5 10 15 20 25 30
0
0.1
0.2
output
5 10 15 20 25 30
0
0.02
0.04
wage
5 10 15 20 25 30
−2
−1
0
marginal cost
5 10 15 20 25 30
−100
0
100
firms profits
5 10 15 20 25 30
−1
0
1
lending banks profits
5 10 15 20 25 30
−1
0
1
deposit banks profits
5 10 15 20 25 30
−5
0
5
GDP
5 10 15 20 25 30
−0.5
0
0.5
solvency − firms
5 10 15 20 25 30
−0.2
0
0.2
solvency − lend. banks
generate responses that are quite similar to those following a quantitative monetary easing shock
to lending banks. Yet its impact on GDP, consumption, and in part on output tends to be of
limited duration. Notable is also a non-negative effect on lending banks default rate. Even though
M lt is injected at rt > r
l
t and thus above the initial refinancing cost, deposit bank profits rise and
so does their capital, which by definition is partly cumulated from retained earnings. Lowering the
price of this liquidity injection even further would, of course, have a positive influence on deposit
bank profits, leaving its impact on other aggregates unchanged.
Figure 2: Figure 1.2: Impulse responses after a liquidity injection shock to firms
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As illustrated in Figure 2, liquidity supply directed at firms improves output but has only a
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limited impact on GDP and consumption. When the central bank lends directly to firms, this
action tends to crowd out bank loans to firms and to decrease lending on the interbank market.
Motivated by cheaper financing, firms decide to default on some of its bank loans which in turn
forces some of the lending banks to dishonor their debt. Altogether, impact to GDP is almost nil;
only capital Kt and lending banks capital F
b
t increase but all other components fall.
Responses to a qualitative easing shock to banks are presented in Figure 3 and 8 in the Ap-
pendix. Contrary to quantitative easing, responses are mostly persistent. As a result of qualitative
easing shock, policy rate and all other interest rates decrease, and inflation follows the same pat-
tern of behavior.
The persistence of responses to the qualitative monetary easing shock in inflation, policy rate,
and the deposit rate does not stand in line with Dib (2010). This is probably due, to the way how
qualitative (and quantitative) monetary actions enter into his model: it happens through a Leon-
tief loan production function, where lending banks either use interbank borrowing plus liquidity
injections or bank capital plus liquidity received from asset swaps. While in our paper after a qual-
itative shock interest rates fall, loan supply increases, marginal cost decreases and thereby reduces
inflationary pressure, Dib’s (2010) findings show almost no increase in loan supply accompanied
by rising interest rates and an increase in inflation.
Figure 3: Figure 1.3: Impulse responses after an asset swap shock to lending banks
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In our setup, the effects of an assets swap tend to resemble the results for the traditional mone-
tary policy shocks, with the same deflationary mechanism as before. As lending banks are relieved
from impaired loans, they pick up on more lending causing the firms’ borrowing rate to go down.
As a result firms accumulate more capital, decide to default less on their lending, increase output
(in the long run), and adjust their prices downwards in order to stimulate demand. Eventually,
the risk-free rate falls due to the fact that the Taylor rule puts more weight on inflation changes
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than on the output fluctuations.
All variables, except for loans to lending banks, react similarly to the quantitative easing aimed
at deposit banks as they did in case of this type of central bank action addressed at the lending
banks (see Figure 8 in the Appendix). The possibility for deposit banks to swap their interbank
loans has the same impact on the balance sheet of deposit bank as swaps of firm loans have on the
balance sheet of lending banks: when the central bank absorbs impaired loans from banks’ balance
sheet (and thus improves deposit banks capital ratio), they instantly expand their lending on the
interbank market at a lower price which, in turn, enhances solvency of lending banks.
When we compare the impulse responses for both types of banks, we observe that the solvency
of firms, in both cases, increases remarkably in the short run and remains above its steady state
in the medium to long run. However, the solvency of lending banks is decreasing when lending
banks are allowed to swap their assets, but is strongly increasing in the short run and it remains
above its steady state over the long horizon when deposit banks are the profiteers of the qualitative
easing. This result indicates that qualitative monetary easing measures aimed at deposit banks
can improve the stability of the financial system.
As Figure 4 shows, insurance payout to lending banks’ improves their solvency and has a per-
sistent effect on the economy. It also increases loans to firms, raises their production capital
marginally and that in turn leads to a raise in output. Since the Taylor rule is driven by output
and inflation, the growth of output results in an increase of the policy rate. The subsequent rising
in interest rates have an ambiguous impact on economy: they increase the marginal cost of capital
for firms which are now trying to substitute capital with labor; in addition, higher interest rates
make consumption less desirable and therefore push households towards more labor supply result-
ing in lower wages. As marginal cost increases, firms mark up the prices letting policy interest
rate to climb up even further. As commercial loan costs pick up, firms choose to default on some
of their debt. Deposit and lending banks profits fall since in steady state their liabilities (deposits
and interbank loans) outweigh their assets (interbank loans and loans to firms) in absolute terms,
which leads to losses in the case of rising interest rates.
We observe in Figure 9 in the Appendix that a similar mechanism is at work in case of an
increase in deposit banks’ equity. Generally, the responses tend towards rising interest rates,
inflation and marginal cost of production whereas consumption, wage, and production capital tend
to fall. However, after an initial pick-up in credit supply to the economy, loans tend to fall in both
real and financial sectors and as the level of interest rates raises, both firms and lending banks
choose to default on more of their debt. The marginal increase in GDP seems to result from a
small rise in the deposit banks’ capital, as other components of GDP tend to fall.
4.2 Experiments
In this section we intend to simulate crisis conditions and then consider the role of central bank’s
instruments of unconventional monetary policy in moderating the crisis. We conduct experiments
with two versions of our model: the basic one, where default rates are endogenously chosen by
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Figure 4: Figure 1.4: Impulse responses after a capital injection shock to lending banks
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firms and lending banks and another version in which default rates are exogenously given as AR (1)
processes:
αt = ρααt−1 + ε
α
t (25)
δt = ρδδt−1 + ε
δ
t (26)
The timeline looks as follows: in the 1st period a shock that introduces a downturn of the
economy occurs. In the first scenario it is a two standard deviations negative productivity shock;
in the second version of the model with exogenous default rates we let the firms’ and lending banks’
solvency ratios fall by 2.5% and 5% respectively. This is supposed to replicate the origin of the
ongoing financial crisis. In the 2nd period the central bank steps in with its unconventional policy
actions. We assume that in each case it commits 5% of GDP into its unconventional policy tools.
We then evaluate the welfare effects simply by comparing present values of future consumption
and GDP once central bank anti-crisis actions have been put in place. In particular, we take into
account:
• liquidity injections to banks and firms,
• asset swaps to banks,
• switching the regulatory regime to the environment where capital ratio k is a function of
output gap such that:
(1 + kt) = (1 + k)
(
Yt
Yt−1
)Qk
exp
(
εkt
)
(27)
• direct capital injections to lending and deposit banks,
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• switching the regulatory regime to the environment with leverage ratio h.
We run the experiment in a deterministic context. We assume that agents have full foresight,
they know when a shock is going to occur and how the central bank is going to react to it. Conse-
quently, agents can specify in advance what actions they want to take in future given the shock and
the central bank commitment to a particular monetary policy measure. In terms of computation,
accounting for perfect foresight of monetary policy corresponds to running a single dynare file with
economy entering a crisis in period one (either negative technology shock or a positive innovation
in default rates of lending banks and firms) and a monetary policy action occurring at some time
thereafter.
Table 1 presents results for our basic model with endogenous default rates. It reveals that all
unconventional policy measures seem to be effective. With a notable exception of qualitative in-
struments, all policy actions mitigate adverse effects of a negative productivity shock on GDP and
consumption5. Liquidity injections to firms seem to work best. The flipside of unconventional
policy actions is the increased volatility of GDP and inflation, at least when quantitative monetary
actions are considered. On the other hand, none of the unconventional policy measures tends to
impact consumption volatility negatively.
Table 5 in the Appendix shows a summary for the version of our model with exogenous de-
fault rates. Here, we allow default rates for firms and lending banks to fall by 2.5 and 5 percent,
respectively. Again, all central bank policy actions tend to reduce negative impact on GDP and
consumption. Quantitative easing to banks contributes to the rising volatility of GDP and inflation
whereas the same policy measure aimed at non-financial firms moderates both the downturn and
the variability of GDP. In addition, making default rates exogenous seems to smooth GDP but it
introduces slightly more variation into consumption and inflation. In the regulatory regime with
leverage ratio, results stay broadly in line with those from the scenarios without limits on bank
leverage (both in case of endogenous as well as of exogenous default rates). It is worth noticing,
that increased requirements on bank capital tend to make recessions less severe and the GDP less
volatile. When looking at inflation variability, liquidity injections tend to substantially increase the
volatility of inflation whereas qualitative easing actions slightly reduce it. It seems that the central
bank that is keen on using unconventional policy tools faces a difficult task of finding a proper
mix of its policy instruments and it has to take into account the ability of those tools to reverse
recession, their destabilizing impact on some of the macroeconomic aggregates and the horizon of
the monetary policy.
Table 6 in the Appendix reports results for a model with endogenous solvency rates and a ho-
mogenous banking sector. We find that shutting down one part of the banking sector makes
5The impact of both the quantitative and qualitative monetary policy depends, of course, not only on the amount
of money devoted to those measures but also on their price. In our model, we assume that the policy rate, rt, defines
the cost of liquidity injections and the return of asset swaps (both types of the unconventional monetary policy
actions have different balance sheet effects, since liquidity injections affect liabilities whereas qualitative easing
affects assets). If the central bank would use a higher markup, it would enhance the impact of the qualitative easing
and dampen the effects of liquidity injections. Now, comparing how both instruments perform in our experiments,
we conclude that the impact of qualitative easing is more sensitive to the height of the interest rate rather than
to the amount of money that it supplies. It is apparent that for an economy facing a period of low interest rates
liquidity injections are more desirable than asset swaps as long as the central bank deploys its policy instruments
at market prices.
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Table 1: Table 1.1: GDP and Consumption Losses for a Model with Endogenous Solvency Rates
basis scenario M bt+M
l
t M
f
t x
b
t+x
l
t k (Y ) $bF
b
t +$lF
l
t
regulatory regime without leverage ratio (bF b = bF l = 0)∑T
t=1 β
t(gdpt−gdp)
gdp
-17.23% -8.80% -8.24% -17.10% -16.98% -16.51%(∑T
t=1(gdpt−gdp)
2
T−1
) 1
2
0.556% 1.237% 1.200% 0.555% 0.549% 0.533%
∑T
t=1 β
t(Ct−C)
C
-10.95% -7.98% -7.43% -10.90% -10.89% -10.98%(∑T
t=1(Ct−C)
2
T−1
) 1
2
0.180% 0.136% 0.141% 0.179% 0.179% 0.181%(∑
T
t=1(pit−pi)
2
T−1
) 1
2
0.042% 0.723% 1.041% 0.041% 0.058% 0.043%
regulatory regime with leverage ratio (bF b = bF l = 10)∑
T
t=1 β
t(gdpt−gdp)
gdp
-17.21% -10.02% -5.91% -16.64% -16.97% -16.53%(∑T
t=1(gdpt−gdp)
2
T−1
) 1
2
0.554% 1.213% 1.171% 0.544% 0.547% 0.531%
∑
T
t=1 β
t(Ct−C)
C
-10.94% -8.51% -6.81% -10.73% -10.88% -10.98%(∑T
t=1(Ct−C)
2
T−1
) 1
2
0.180% 0.145% 0.152% 0.176% 0.179% 0.181%(∑
T
t=1(pit−pi)
2
T−1
) 1
2
0.031% 0.339% 0.816% 0.031% 0.041% 0.032%
Note: This table shows present value of GDP and consumption loss as well as variation in GDP,
consumption and inflation rate after positive shocks to default rates and subsequent central bank actions.
First column shows results for a basis scenario consisting of a negative two standard deviations technology
shock in a model with endogenous solvency rates. Subsequent columns present results of quantitative
easing to banks, quantitative easing to firms, qualitative easing to banks, regime switch to output driven
capital ratio and capital injection to banks, respectively, amounting to 5% of GDP each. T = 30.
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recessions more severe in terms of GDP and consumption loss. Standard deviation of GDP and
consumption rises whereas the variability of inflation decreases slightly. We conclude that having
a heterogeneous banking sector enhances economy’s resilience against economic downturns and
moderates the variation in the most macroeconomic aggregates. In addition, the heterogeneity of
banks also improves the effects of monetary policy actions.
Generally, results from Tables 1 and 5 suggest, that a central bank which puts more weight on tar-
geting inflation should use more qualitative easing tools. On the other hand, a central bank which
primarily focuses on GDP should apply quantitative easing instruments. Therefore, the inflation
targeting central bank would observe a higher output gap when trying to manage inflation in the
short run whereas central bank that stabilizes GDP in the long run would produce an excessive
inflation variability6.
5 Conclusion
The ongoing financial crisis revealed that standard DSGE models need to account for financial
sectors of the economy. Recent research work7 proposes models with heterogeneous banking sec-
tor that are able to capture financial frictions and their transmission mechanism in the economy.
We follow this approach and extend a relatively simple model of de Walque et al. (2009) by
introducing a nominal dimension, several monetary shocks, and changes in the rules of the finan-
cial supervision. In particular, this setup enables us to study impacts of unconventional monetary
policy actions at times of low interest rates when various capital adequacy requirements are in force.
We show that in this framework qualitative monetary easing impulses tend to produce more per-
sistent changes in aggregates and their impact on GDP and consumption, though limited in mag-
nitude, is similar to the expansionary monetary policy. Quantitative monetary easing shock, on
the other hand, is more effective in the short run (in terms of changes in output and GDP) but
does not seem to affect variables in the long run. Equity injections to banks achieve rather modest
results in mitigating losses from financial frictions, yet they are able to substantially improve the
solvency rates in the financial sector. In terms of consumption and GDP losses, direct credit to
firms outperforms the unconventional actions aimed at banks. A direct capital payout to financial
institutions diminishes consumption, raises inflationary pressure and results in small and persistent
positive responses of GDP.
Our experiments in Section 4 also support the general result that the quantitative monetary policy
actions are superior to other tools. In addition, we conclude that in cases when capital ratio is
tied to the output gap or when banks receive equity injections GDP fluctuations get smaller. In
general, we observe that if financial institutions are supposed to meet additional capital adequacy
requirements, GDP volatility is smaller and recessions are less extreme.
Future work could consist of introducing other fiscal policy tools into the model. It would also be
of interest to model richer financial markets with other financial intermediaries, like brokers and
6See discussion on the policy horizon in Smets (2003).
7Dib (2010) and Gerali et al. (2010).
17
so called shadow banks8. Recent research suggests that the analysis of their balance sheets could
be used for prediction of economic activity and inflation dynamics9.
8We refer to ABS issuers, finance companies, and funding corporations as “shadow banks”.
9See Adrian, Moench, and Shin (2010).
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6 Appendix
6.1 First Order Conditions
Note: for (t+ s)-terms expectation operator is omitted for notational convenience.
Households
wt = m
Ct
(1−Nt)
(28)
1− Tt
Ct
(
1 + rlt
) = β 1
Ct+1pit+1
− χ

 Dht
1 + rlt
−
D
h
1 + r
l

 1
1 + rlt
(29)
Non-financial Firms
YN = wt (30)
YK = λt − βt+1 (1− τ) λt+1 (31)
λt
1 + rbt
= βt+1
αt+1
pit+1
+ βt+2γ
(1− αt+1)
2
pit+1
(
Lft
pit+1
+ df
)
(32)
Lft−1
pit
= βt+1γ (1− αt)
(
Lft−1
pit
+ df
)2
(33)
θ (1−mct) = 1− ψ (pit − pi
∗)pit − βt+1ψ (pit+1 − pi
∗)pit+1
Yt+1
Yt
(34)
mct = exp (At)
η−1
(
rbt
(
1 + rbt
)
η
)η (
wt
1− η
)1−η
(35)
Deposit Banks
λlt
1 + rlt
= βt+1
λlt+1
pit+1
(36)
λlt
1 + it
= βt+1
δt+1λ
l
t+1
pit+1
+ βt+2ζl (1− δt+1)
λlt+2
pit+1
− dF lkw
l
− bF lh (37)
dF lvl =
(
λlt (1 + vlrt)−
1
Πlt
)
− βt+1 (1− ξl +$l)
(
λlt+1 −
1
Πlt+1
)
1
pit+1
(38)
Lending Banks
λbt
1 + it
= βt+1
λbt+1δt+1
pit+1
+ βt+2λ
b
t+2ω
(1− δt+1)
pit+1
2(
Dbdt
pit+1
+ dδ
)
(39)
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λbt
1 + rbt
= βt+1
αt+1λ
b
t+1
pit+1
+ βt+2ζb (1− αt+1)
λbt+2
pit+1
− dF bkw
b
− bF bh (40)
λbtD
bd
t−1
pit
= βt+1λ
b
t+1ω (1− δt)
(
Dbdt−1
pit
+ dδ
)2
(41)
dF bvb =
(
λbt (1 + vbrt)−
1
Πbt
)
− βt+1 (1− ξb +$b)
(
λbt+1 −
1
Πbt+1
)
1
pit+1
(42)
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6.2 Tables
Table 2: Table 1.2: Calibrated Parameters
households firms banks monetary policy
r
l
0.0035 θ 4.24 k 0.08 ω 367 Qp 1.2
χ 0.01 ψ 50 h 0.04 dδ 0.02 Qy 0.05
D
l
0.39 ρa 0.95 ρ 0.01 r 0.0015
β 0.9965 η 0.333 B
l
0.19 B
b
0.19 µr 0.7
m 3.72 τ 0.03 dF l 53.4 dF b 6.71 pi
∗ 1
γ 103.5 ζl 0.8 ζb 0.8 Qk 0.5
df 0.001 ξl 0.07 ξb 0.06
vl 0.5 vb 0.5
wl 0.05 wb 0.8
ρM(·) 0.85 ρx(·) 0.85
bF l 10 bF b 10
Table 3: Table 1.3: Steady State Values
Variable Definition Value
endogenous default rates exogenous default rates
steady state values bF (·) = 0 bF (·) = 10 bF (·) = 0 bF (·) = 10
pi inflation 1.0009 1.0034 1.0003 1.0031
r central bank interest rate 0.0050 0.0154 0.0028 0.0138
rl deposit interest rate 0.0044 0.0070 0.0038 0.0066
i interbank interest rate 0.0091 0.0122 0.0081 0.0111
rb firms’ borrowing interest rate 0.0161 0.0201 0.0154 0.0195
α solvency rate: firms 0.9490 0.9490 0.9500 0.9500
δ solvency rate: lending banks 0.9774 0.9766 0.9800 0.9800
mc marginal cost of production 0.7848 0.8454 0.7720 0.8362
w wage 2.0895 2.0880 2.0907 2.0893
steady state ratios
C/Y consumption to output 0.7138 0.7138 0.7136 0.7135
K/Y capital stock to output 9.8231 9.8098 9.8347 9.8220
Πf/Y firms’ profits to output 0.0418 0.0418 0.0415 0.0415
Πb/Y lending banks’ profits to output 0.0051 0.0051 0.0052 0.0051
Πl/Y deposit banks’ profits to output 0.0013 0.0012 0.0013 0.0013
F b/Y lending banks’ own funds to output 0.0422 0.0403 0.0427 0.0403
F l/Y deposit banks’ own funds to output 0.0088 0.0080 0.0095 0.0087
Dl/gdp deposits to GDP 0.6134 0.6157 0.6125 0.6148
Dbs/gdp interbank lending to GDP 0.1192 0.1121 0.1383 0.1358
Lb/gdp firms’ borrowing to GDP 0.2960 0.2969 0.2961 0.2970
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Table 4: Table 1.4: Second Moments (Model with Endogenous Default Rates and No Leverage
Ratio)
Variable σ
pi 0.00106
K 0.21568
N 0.00264
Y 0.02222
C 0.01102
w 0.05478
gdp 0.02221
Table 5: Table 1.5: GDP and Consumption Losses for a Model with Exogenous Solvency Rates
basis scenario M bt+M
l
t M
f
t x
b
t+x
l
t k (Y ) $bF
b
t +$lF
l
t
regulatory regime without leverage ratio (bF b = bF l = 0)∑
T
t=1 β
t(gdpt−gdp)
gdp
-9.15% -2.70% 5.64% -8.45% -9.13% -8.52%(∑
T
t=1(gdpt−gdp)
2
T−1
) 1
2
0.471% 0.880% 0.838% 0.464% 0.470% 0.458%
∑
T
t=1 β
t(Ct−C)
C
-2.72% -0.51% 1.00% -2.51% -2.72% -2.76%(∑T
t=1(Ct−C)
2
T−1
) 1
2
0.240% 0.351% 0.251% 0.241% 0.240% 0.240%(∑T
t=1(pit−pi)
2
T−1
) 1
2
0.231% 0.681% 0.859% 0.224% 0.236% 0.234%
regulatory regime with leverage ratio (bF b = bF l = 10)∑T
t=1 β
t(gdpt−gdp)
gdp
-8.74% -1.50% 5.69% -7.67% -8.70% -8.15%(∑
T
t=1(gdpt−gdp)
2
T−1
) 1
2
0.458% 0.905% 0.843% 0.449% 0.456% 0.446%
∑
T
t=1 β
t(Ct−C)
C
-2.58% 0.11% 1.12% -2.27% -2.58% -2.63%(∑
T
t=1(Ct−C)
2
T−1
) 1
2
0.236% 0.353% 0.252% 0.236% 0.235% 0.236%(∑T
t=1(pit−pi)
2
T−1
) 1
2
0.178% 0.657% 0.719% 0.175% 0.179% 0.179%
Note:
This table shows present value of GDP and consumption loss as well as variation in GDP, consumption
and inflation rate after positive shocks to default rates and subsequent central bank actions. First column
shows results for a basis scenario consisting of a positive 2,5% and 5% shocks to firm and lending banks
default rates, respectively, in a model with exogenous solvency rates. Subsequent columns present results
of quantitative easing to banks, quantitative easing to firms, qualitative easing to banks, regime switch to
output driven capital ratio and capital injection to banks, respectively, amounting to 5% of GDP each. T
= 30.
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Table 6: Table 1.6: GDP and Consumption Losses for a Model with no Interbank Market
basis scenario M lt M
f
t x
l
t k (Y ) $lF
l
t
regulatory regime without leverage ratio (bF l = 0)∑
T
t=1 β
t(gdpt−gdp)
gdp
-17.84% -14.24% -16.75% -17.23% -17.17% -17.46%(∑T
t=1(gdpt−gdp)
2
T−1
) 1
2
0.581% 1.280% 1.294% 0.566% 0.561% 0.569%
∑
T
t=1 β
t(Ct−C)
C
-11.18% -9.87% -10.46% -10.75% -11.04% -11.26%(∑T
t=1(Ct−C)
2
T−1
) 1
2
0.185% 0.167% 0.182% 0.178% 0.182% 0.186%(∑T
t=1(pit−pi)
2
T−1
) 1
2
0.011% 0.102% 0.123% 0.014% 0.017% 0.010%
regulatory regime with leverage ratio (bF l = 10)∑
T
t=1 β
t(gdpt−gdp)
gdp
-17.84% -14.29% -16.82% -17.17% -17.13% -17.45%(∑
T
t=1(gdpt−gdp)
2
T−1
) 1
2
0.581% 1.279% 1.292% 0.564% 0.560% 0.568%
∑
T
t=1 β
t(Ct−C)
C
-11.18% -9.92% -10.52% -10.69% -11.03% -11.27%(∑
T
t=1(Ct−C)
2
T−1
) 1
2
0.185% 0.167% 0.182% 0.177% 0.182% 0.186%(∑T
t=1(pit−pi)
2
T−1
) 1
2
0.011% 0.099% 0.118% 0.015% 0.016% 0.010%
Note: This table shows present value of GDP and consumption loss as well as variation in GDP, con-
sumption and inflation rate after positive shocks to default rates and subsequent central bank actions.
First column shows results for a basis scenario consisting of a negative two standard deviations technology
shock; subsequent columns present results of quantitative easing to banks, quantitative easing to firms,
qualitative easing to banks, regime switch to output driven capital ratio and capital injection to banks,
respectively, amounting to 5% of GDP each. T = 30. Model with endogenous solvency rate for firms
and homogenous banking sector which offers deposits to households, lends to firms and is not subject to
default.
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6.3 Figures
Figure 5: Figure 1.5: Impulse responses after a positive technology shock
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Figure 6: Figure 1.6: Impulse responses after an expansionary monetary policy shock
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Figure 7: Figure 1.7: Impulse responses after a liquidity injection shock to deposit banks
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Figure 8: Figure 1.8: Impulse responses after an asset swap shock to deposit banks
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Figure 9: Figure 1.9: Impulse responses after a capital injection shock to deposit banks
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